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Possibilistic networks offer a qualitative approach for modeling epistemic uncertainty. Their
practical implementation requires the specification of conditional possibility tables, as in
the case of Bayesian networks for probabilities. The elicitation of probability tables by
experts is made much easier by means of noisy logical gates that enable multidimensional
tables to be constructed from the knowledge of a few parameters. This paper presents the
possibilistic counterparts of usual noisy connectives (and, or, max, min, . . . ). Their interest
and limitations are illustrated on an example taken from a human geography modeling
problem. The difference of behavior between probabilistic and possibilistic connectives is
discussed in detail. Results in this paper may be useful to bring possibilistic networks
closer to applications.
1. Introduction
A belief network [24,25] is a convenient way of representing the interaction between uncertain variables in the form of 
a directed graph, each node of which represents a variable. The graphical structure takes advantage of known conditional 
independence between these variables. Each variable is directly influenced only by its parent variables in the graph. Given 
such a directed graph between variables and local conditional probability tables, the joint probability distribution of these 
variables can be retrieved; see [20] for an introduction to Bayesian belief networks. In fact they can be built in two ways: 
they can be extracted from data or made up by a human expert. In the first case, a supposedly large dataset involving 
a number of variables is available, and the Bayesian network is obtained by some machine learning procedure. The prob-
ability tables thus obtained have a frequentist flavor, and the simplest network possible is searched for. On the contrary, 
when Bayesian networks can be specified using expert knowledge, the structure of a network relating the variables is first 
given, often relying on causal connections between variables and conditional independence relations the expert is aware of. 
Then, subjective probability tables must be filled by the expert. They consist, for each variable in the network, of conditional 
probabilities for that variable, conditioned on each configuration of its parent variables. Note that, even if causal relations as 
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perceived by the expert are instrumental in building a simple and interpretable network, the joint probability distribution 
obtained by combining the probability tables no longer accounts for causality (there are as many belief networks as permu-
tations of variables representing the same joint probability distribution). Another difficulty arises for subjective expert-based 
Bayes networks: if variables are not binary and/or the number of parent variables is more than two, the task of eliciting 
numerical probability tables becomes tedious, if not impossible to fulfill. Indeed, the number of probability values to be 
supplied increases exponentially with the number of parent variables.
To alleviate the elicitation task, the notion of noisy logical gate (or connective) has been introduced by Pearl [24], based 
on the assumption of independent causal influences that can be combined (see also [25], Sec. 4.3.2). As a result, one small 
conditional probability table is elicited per parent variable, and the probability table of each variable given its parents is 
obtained by combining these small tables via a so-called noisy connective, which may include a so-called leakage factor 
summarizing the causal effect of variables not explicitly present in the network [10,19].
While the notion of noisy connective solves the combinatorial problem of collecting many probability values to a large 
extent, the issue remains that people cannot always provide precise probability assessments. Let alone the fact that the 
probability scale is too fine-grained for human perception of belief or frequencies, some conditional probability values may 
be ill-known or plainly unknown to the experts. The usual Bayesian recommendation in the latter case is to use uniform 
distributions, but it is well-known (see for instance [15,16]) that these distributions do not properly model ignorance. 
Alternatively, one may use imprecise probability networks (called credal networks) [21], qualitative Bayesian networks [27]
or possibilistic networks [5]. While the two first options extend probabilistic networks to ill-known parameters (with an 
interval-based approach for the first extension and an ordinal approach for the second), possibilistic networks represent a 
more drastic departure from probabilistic networks. In their qualitative version, possibilistic networks can be defined on 
a finite chain of possibility values and do not refer to numerical values. This feature may make the collection of expert 
information on conditional tables easier than requiring precise numbers obeying the laws of probability. However, when it 
comes to filling conditional uncertainty tables, the dimensionality issue present in Bayesian networks remains the same in 
the possibilistic environment.
This is why in this paper, we propose possibilistic counterparts of noisy connectives of probabilistic networks. As possi-
bilistic uncertainty is merely epistemic and due to a lack of information, we shall speak of uncertain connectives. The idea 
of possibilistic uncertain gates was first considered empirically by Parsons and Bigham [23] directly in the setting of possi-
bilistic logic, at a time when possibilistic networks had not yet been introduced. It seems that the question of possibilistic 
uncertain gates has not been reconsidered ever since, if we except a recent study in the broader setting of imprecise prob-
abilities [1]. The basic ideas pervading this paper first appear in a French conference paper by the authors [8], then more 
formally in the SUM 2015 conference proceedings [11].
This paper elaborates on these preliminary versions. In particular, we explain the construction of possibilistic gates in 
greater detail. Moreover, we introduce the leaky version of several such gates, as well as variants needed for describing 
the reinforcement of the possibility of effects due to the presence of multiple causes. A comparison between probabilistic 
(noisy) gates and possibilistic gates is carried out, emphasizing their difference in terms of expressive power and respective 
concerns. Lastly, an extensive account of the application to human geography is provided.
The paper is structured as follows. After recalling probabilistic networks with noisy gates in Section 2, we present the 
corresponding approach for possibilistic networks and present various uncertain gates, especially the AND, OR, MAX, and 
MIN functions in Section 3. In Section 4, we compare the uncertain OR-gate and the noisy OR-gate in detail, and propose a 
variant of the uncertain MAX that behaves more in agreement with the noisy MAX. Algorithms needed to implement this 
approach are discussed in Section 5. Finally, the approach, including algorithmic issues, is illustrated in Section 6 on a belief 
network dealing with an application to human geography.
2. Probabilistic networks with independent causal influences
Consider a set of independent variables X1, . . . , Xn that influence the value of a variable Y . In the ideal case, there is a 
deterministic function f such that Y = f (X1, X2, . . . , Xn). In order to account for uncertainty, one may assume the existence 
of intermediary variables Z1, . . . , Zn , such that Z i expresses the fact that Xi will have a causal influence on Y , and which 
value of Y it enforces (Z i has the same range as Y ). It is assumed that the relation between Xi and Z i is probabilistic 
and that Z i is independent of other variables given Xi . Besides, we consider the deterministic function as affected by the 
auxiliary variables Z i only. In other words, we get a probabilistic network such that [10]
P (Y , Z1, . . . , Zn, X1, . . . , Xn)= P (Y , Z1, . . . , Zn) ·
n∏
i=1
P (Z i | Xi), (1)
where P (Y , Z1, . . . , Zn) = 1 if Y = f (Z1, . . . , Zn) and 0 otherwise. This is called a noisy function. In particular, notice that 
the dependence tables between Y and X1, . . . , Xn can now be obtained by combining simple conditional probability distri-
butions pertaining to single factors. For any effect value y of Y , and every n-tuple (x1, . . . , xn) of input values:
P (y | x1, . . . , xn)=
∑
z1,...,zn:y= f (z1,...,zn)
n∏
i=1
P (zi | xi). (2)
This is the assumption of independence of causal influence (ICI) [10]. In the case of Boolean variables, it is assumed that 
P (Z i = 0 | Xi = 0) = 1 (if no cause, then no effect), while P (Z i = 0 | Xi = 1) could be positive (the effect may or may not 
appear when the cause is present).
Canonical ICI models are obtained by means of specific choices of functions f . For instance, if all variables are Boolean, 
f will be a logical connective. In this case, we speak of noisy OR ( f =∨) [24,25], noisy AND ( f =∧); if the range of the Z i ’s 
and Y is a totally ordered set, usual gates are the noisy MAX ( f =max), or MIN ( f =min). ICI models are in the same spirit 
as early probabilistic approaches to diagnosis such as the parsimonious covering theory of Peng and Reggia [26], where the 
likelihood of a manifestation to be produced by a set of independent causes is computed from the individual likelihoods for 
each cause.
The approach may be further refined by allowing f to summarize the potential effect of external variables not taken into 
account: this is the leaky model. Then, Y also depends on a leakage variable Z L not explicitly related to identified causes, 
i.e., Y = f (Z1, Z2, . . . , Zn, Z L). The range of Z L is supposed to be the range of f , i.e., the range of Y and this variable is
independent of the other ones. Hence, the leaky model may be written as:
P (Y , Z1, . . . , Zn, Z L,x)= P (Y , Z1, . . . , Zn) · P (Z L) ·
n∏
i=1
P (Z i | Xi),
so that for any value y of Y and any configuration (x1, . . . , xn) of parent variables:
P (y | x1, . . . , xn)=
∑
z1,...,zn,zL :y= f (z1,...,zn,zL)
P (zL) ·
n∏
i=1
P (zi | xi). (3)
For instance, in the case of Boolean variables, P (Y = 1 | X1 = 0, . . . , Xn = 0) may be positive due to such external causes.
We will now turn to the question whether the same kind of ICI approach can be used to elicit possibilistic networks as 
well.
3. Uncertain logical gates in canonical possibilistic networks
Possibility theory [12,30] is based on maxitive set functions associated to possibility distributions. Formally, given a 
universe of discourse U , a possibility distribution π : U → [0,1] pertains to a variable X ranging on U and represents the 
available (incomplete) information about the more or less possible values of X , assumed to be single-valued. Thus, π(u) = 0
means that X = u is impossible. The consistency of information is expressed by the normalization of π :∃u ∈ U , π(u) = 1, 
namely, at least one value is fully possible for X . Distinct values u and u′ may be simultaneously possible at degree 1. 
A state of complete ignorance is represented by the distribution π?(u) = 1, ∀u ∈ U . The degree of possibility of an event 
A ⊆ U is defined by the set function
5(A)= sup
u∈A
π(u)
called a possibility measure. Possibility measures are maxitive, i.e.,
∀A,∀B,5(A ∪ B)=max(5(A),5(B)).
The underlying assumption is that the agent focuses on the most plausible values compatible with event A, neglecting 
other ones. A dual measure of necessity N(A) = 1 −5(U \ A) expresses the degree of certainty of event A as the degree of 
impossibility of non-A.
A possibilistic network [5] has the same structure as a Bayesian network. The joint possibility for n variables linked by 
an acyclic directed graph is defined by the chain rule:
π(x1, . . . , xn)= ∗i=1,...,nπ(xi | pa(Xi)),
where xi is an instantiation of the variable Xi , and pa(Xi) an instantiation of the parent variables of Xi . The operation ∗ is 
generally chosen as the minimum (in the qualitative case) [3], or the product (in the numerical case) [6], and this is what we 
shall assume in the sequel. Note that the behavior of product-based possibilistic nets is very close to the one of Bayes nets, 
while min-based possibilistic networks have specific properties. For instance, starting from possibilistic conditional tables, 
and building the joint possibility distribution using the chain rule, one cannot generally retrieve the same conditional tables, 
due to the drowning effect of the min operation [5].
3.1. Uncertain causal functions in possibilistic networks
Deterministic models Y = f (X1, . . . , Xn) are defined like in the probabilistic case:
π(y | x1, . . . , xn)=
{
1 if y = f (x1, . . . xn);
0 otherwise.
(4)
Table 1
Elementary causal possibility table.
π(Z i |Xi) xi ¬xi
zi 1 0
¬zi κi 1
Note that if y = f (x1, . . . xn), then π(y | x1, . . . , xn) = 1 indicates the certainty of y because other values of Y are treated as 
impossible since f is a function.
Let us define possibilistic models with independent causal influences (ICI). We use a deterministic function Y =
f (Z1, . . . , Zn) with n intermediary causal variables Z i , as for the probabilistic models, which indicate that the cause Xi
has produced its effect. Now, π(y | x1, . . . , xn) is of the form:
π(y | z1, . . . , zn) ∗π(z1, . . . , zn | x1, . . . , xn),
where π(y | z1, . . . , zn) obeys Equation (4). Again, each variable Z i only depends (in an uncertain way) on the variable Xi . 
Thus, we have π(z1, . . . , zn | x1, . . . , xn) = ∗i=1,...,nπ(zi | xi). This leads to the equality
π(y | x1, . . . , xn)= max
z1,...,zn:y= f (z1,...,zn)
∗i=1,...,nπ(zi | xi), (5)
whose similarity with Eq. (2) is striking. Notice that, when ∗ = min, Eq. (5) boils down to applying the extension prin-
ciple [30] to function f , assuming fuzzy-valued inputs F1, . . . , Fn , where the membership function of F i is defined by 
µF i (zi) = π(zi | xi).
In case we suppose that y also depends in an uncertain way on other causes summarized by a leakage variable Z L , 
giving birth to a leaky ICI model, we then get the counterpart of Eq. (3), which reads:
π(y | x1, . . . , xn)= max
z1,...,zn,zL :y= f (z1,...,zn,zL)
∗i=1,...,nπ(zi | xi) ∗π(zL). (6)
In the following, we provide a detailed analysis of possibilistic counterparts of noisy gates.
3.2. Uncertain OR
The variables are assumed to be Boolean (i.e., Y = y or ¬y, etc.). The uncertain OR (counterpart of the probabilistic 
“noisy OR”) assumes that Xi = xi for at least one variable Xi represents a sufficient cause for getting Y = y, and Z i = zi
indicates that Xi = xi has caused Y = y. This gives f (Z1, . . . , Zn) =
∨n
i=1 Z i . The uncertainty indicates that the causes may 
fail to produce their effects. Z i =¬zi indicates that Xi = xi did not cause Y = y due to the presence of some inhibitor that 
prevents the effect from taking place. We assume it is more possible that Xi = xi causes Y = y than the opposite (otherwise 
one could not say that Xi = xi is sufficient for causing Y = y). Then we must define π(zi | xi) = 1 and π(¬zi | xi) = κi < 1. 
Besides, π(zi | ¬xi) = 0, since when Xi is absent, it does not cause y. Hence the elementary causal possibility table, where 
each column should contain 1, to get normal conditional possibility distributions (see Table 1).
Note that in the case of a probabilistic network, π(zi | xi) = 1 is replaced by P (zi | xi) = 1 − κi in Table 1.
Let x be a configuration of (X1, . . . , Xn), where xi denotes a literal (xi or ¬xi) for Xi (and the same convention for Z i ). 
We can then obtain the table of the conditional possibility distribution π(Y | X1, . . . , Xn) by means of Eq. (5).
π(y | x)= max
Z1,...,Zn:Z1∨···∨Zn=y
∗ni=1π(Z i | xi)
=
n
max
i=1
π(zi | xi) ∗ (∗ j 6=i max(π(z j | x j),π(¬z j | x j))
=
n
max
i=1
π(zi | xi);
π(¬y | x)= max
Z1,...,Zn:Z1∨···∨Zn=¬y
∗ni=1π(Z i | xi)
= π(¬z1 | x1) ∗ · · · ∗π(¬zn | xn).
Note that in the second line of the computation of π(y | x), one must enforce Z i = y for one variable Z i , while other 
variables take arbitrary values (we have n possible choices of Z i). Of course max(π(z j | x j), π(¬z j | x j)) = 1 due to nor-
malization. Besides, in the computation of π(¬y | x), the condition Z1 ∨ · · · ∨ Zn = ¬y can be obtained for sure only if 
pa(Y ) = (¬z1, . . . , ¬zn).
Let I+(x) = {i : Xi = xi} and I−(x) = {i : Xi = ¬xi}. Then, if the above causal elementary possibility table is adopted, we 
get:
• π(¬y | x) = ∗i=1,...,nπ(¬zi | xi) = ∗i∈I+(x)κi ;
• π(y | x) = 1 when x 6= (¬x1, . . . , ¬xn) (since the term π(zi | xi) = 1 appears for some i in max
n
i=1π(zi | xi));
Table 2
Uncertain OR for 2 inputs.
π(y | X1X2) x1 ¬x1
x2 1 1
¬x2 1 0
π(¬y | X1X2) x1 ¬x1
x2 κ1 ∗ κ2 κ2
¬x2 κ1 1
Table 3
The leaky uncertain OR for 2 inputs.
π(y | X1X2) x1 ¬x1
x2 1 1
¬x2 1 κL
π(¬y | X1X2) x1 ¬x1
x2 κ1 ∗ κ2 κ2
¬x2 κ1 1
• π(¬y | ¬x1, . . . , ¬xn) = 1, π(y | ¬x1, . . . , ¬xn) = 0: ¬y (no effect) can be obtained for sure only if all the causes are
absent.
For n = 2, this gives the conditional Table 2.
More generally, if there are n causes, we have to provide the values of n parameters κi .
For the uncertain leaky OR, we now assume that the function f takes the form f (Z1, . . . , Zn) =
∨n
i=1 Z i ∨ Z L , where Z L
is an unknown external cause. We assign π(zL) = κL < 1 (hence, π(¬zL) = 1) considering that zL is not a usual cause. We 
thus obtain
• π(¬y | x) = ∗i=1,...,nπ(¬zi | xi) ∗π(¬zL) = ∗i∈I+(x)κi ;
• π(y | x) = 1, if x 6= (¬x1, . . . , ¬xn);
• π(¬y | ¬x1, . . . , ¬xn) = 1;
• π(y | ¬x1, . . . , ¬xn) = κL (even if the causes xi are absent, there is still a possibility for having Y = y, namely if the
external cause is present).
Indeed, we get (letting ¬x = (¬x1, . . . , ¬xn)),
π(y | ¬x1, . . . ,¬xn)=max(π(y | ¬x, zL) ∗π(zL),π(y | ¬x,¬zL) ∗π(¬zL)))
=max(1 ∗ κL,0 ∗ 1)= κL .
For n = 2, the conditional table becomes Table 3.
The only 0 entry has been replaced by the leakage coefficient. For n causes, we have now to provide the values of n + 1
parameters κi .
3.3. Uncertain AND
Let us consider Boolean variables (Y = y or ¬y, etc.). The uncertain AND (counterpart of the probabilistic “noisy AND”) 
uses the same local conditional tables but it assumes that Xi = xi represents a necessary cause for Y = y. We again build
the conditional possibility tables π(Y | X1, . . . , Xn) by means of Eq. (5) using f (Z1, . . . , Zn) =
∧n
i=1 Z i instead. This is the 
De Morgan dual to the uncertain OR gate:
π(y | x)= max
Z1,...,Zn:Z1∧···∧Zn=y
∗ni=1π(Z i | xi)
= π(z1 | x1) ∗ · · · ∗π(zn | xn);
π(¬y | x)= max
Z1,...,Zn:Z1∧···∧Zn=¬y
∗ni=1π(zi | xi)
=
n
max
i=1
π(¬zi | xi) ∗ (∗ j 6=i max(π(z j | x j),π(¬z j | x j))
=
n
max
i=1
π(¬zi | xi).
We notice that 
∧n
i=1 Z i = y can be obtained only if pa(Y ) = (z1, . . . , zn). Thus, we find
• π(¬y | x1, . . . , xn) =max
n
i=1π(¬zi | xi) =max
n
i=1 κi ;
• π(y | x1, . . . , xn) = 1;
• π(¬y | x) = 1, π(y | x) = 0 if x 6= (x1, . . . , xn) (if at least one of the causes is absent, the effect is necessarily absent).
Table 4
Uncertain AND for 2 inputs.
π(y | X1X2) x1 ¬x1
x2 1 0
¬x2 0 0
π(¬y | X1X2) x1 ¬x1
x2 max(κ1,κ2) 1
¬x2 1 1
Table 5
Leaky uncertain AND for 2 inputs.
π(y | X1X2) x1 ¬x1
x2 1 κL
¬x2 κL κL
π(¬y | X1X2) x1 ¬x1
x2 max(κ1,κ2) 1
¬x2 1 1
For n = 2, Eq. (5) yields the conditional tables for the uncertain AND (Table 4).
More generally, if there are n causes, we have to assess n values for the parameters κi .
The case of the uncertain AND with leak corresponds to the possibility π(zL) = κL < 1 that an external factor Z L = zL
causes Y = y independently of the values of the Xi . Namely f (Z1, . . . , Zn, Z L) = (
∧n
i=1 Z i) ∨ Z L . For n = 2, Eq. (5) then gives 
the combined conditional possibility in Table 5, similar to Table 3. The difference is that the leakage coefficient appears in 
three entries of the matrix for y, as the effect is then given a chance to appear when the two causes are not simultaneously 
present.
3.4. Uncertain MAX
The uncertain MAX is a multiple-valued extension of the uncertain OR, where the output variable Y (hence the 
variables Z i) is valued on a finite, totally ordered, severity or intensity scale L = {0 < 1 < · · · < m}. We assume that 
Y =max(Z1, . . . , Zn). The statement Z i = zi ∈ L represents the fact that Xi alone has increased the value of Y at level zi . In 
this subsection, y, zi denote any values in L, and xi any value in the range of Xi . The elementary conditional possibility dis-
tributions π(y | xi) are supposed to be given. We can then compute the conditional tables π(y | x) where x = (x1, . . . , xn), 
as:
π(y | x)= max
(z1,...,zn)∈Ln:y=max(z1,...,zn)
∗ni=1π(zi | xi)
=
n
max
i=1
π(Z i = y | xi) ∗
(
∗ j 6=i5(Z j ≤ y | x j)
)
.
In a causal setting, we assume that y = 0 is a normal state (no effect), and y > 0 is more or less abnormal, y =m being 
fully abnormal (strong effect). Suppose that the range of Xi is L as well. It is natural to assume that:
• if Xi = j then Z i = j is completely possible, which means 5(Z i = j | Xi = j) = 1;
• if Xi = 0 then Z i = 0, which means 5(Z i 6= 0 | Xi = 0) = 0 (no cause, no effect);
• 0 <5(Z i < j | Xi = j) < 1 (a cause having strong intensity possibly induces an effect with weak severity, or may even
have no effect at all, but this is abnormal);
• an effect with severity weaker than the intensity of a cause is all the less plausible as the effect is weaker. This leads
to suppose the following inequalities:
π(Z i = 0 | Xi = j)≤ π(Z i = 1 | Xi = j)≤ · · · ≤ π(Z i = j | Xi = j)= 1;
• an effect with severity higher than the intensity of a cause is all the less plausible as the effect is stronger. This leads
to suppose the following inequalities:
π(Z i =m | Xi = j)≤ π(Z i =m− 1 | Xi = j)≤ · · · ≤ π(Z i = j | Xi = j)= 1.
This leads to state the elementary conditional table on the left-hand side of Table 6 (for 3 levels of strength 0, 1, 2), 
where κ02i ≤ κ
12
i . In case we have m levels of strength, we have to assess 
m(m+1)
2
+
m(m−1)
2
=m2 coefficients. There are two 
interesting special cases:
• κ21i =5(Z i > j | Xi = j) = 0: if we assume that a cause having a weak intensity cannot induce an effect with strong 
severity;
• κ21i = κ
01
i = 1: if we remain in total ignorance of what a cause having a weak intensity can produce.
On the right-hand side is the corresponding table when the variables Xi are Boolean (then the middle column is 
dropped).
Table 6
Elementary conditional tables in the many-valued case.
π(Z i | Xi) Xi = 2 Xi = 1 Xi = 0
Z i = 2 1 κ
21
i 0
Z i = 1 κ
12
i 1 0
Z i = 0 κ
02
i κ
01
i 1
π(Z i | Xi) Xi = 2 Xi = 0
Z i = 2 1 0
Z i = 1 κ
12
i 0
Z i = 0 κ
02
i 1
The global conditional possibility tables are then obtained by applying Eq. (5), using the values of π(Z i | Xi), as given in 
the Table 6.
π(y|x)=
n
max
i=1
π(Z i = y|xi) ∗ (∗ j 6=i5(Z j ≤ j|x j)).
As above, in the case of the leaky uncertain max, we consider the output Y is of the form max(Z1, . . . , Zn, Z L) where Z L
is an unknown cause that may affect Y . The expression π(y | x) is now expressed as
π(y | x)= max
(z1,...,zn,zL)∈Ln+1:y=max(z1,...,zn,zL)
∗ni=1π(zi | xi) ∗π(zL)
=max
{
maxni=1π(Z i = y | xi) ∗5(Z L ≤ y) ∗
(
∗ j 6=i5(Z j ≤ y | x j)
)
,
π(Z L = y) ∗
(
∗ni=15(Z i ≤ y | xi)
)
The possibility distribution for the leak variable is given by m + 1 values πL(i) = κ
i
L , where κ
0
L = 1 (it is completely possible 
that the external cause has no effect on Y ), and κ iL ≥ κ
i+1
L (it is all the more unlikely that the external cause is present as 
the observed effect is strong). Under these assumptions the above expressions simplify since 5(Z L ≤ y) = 1.
For n = 2, m = 2, the conditional Table 7 is obtained when the Xi ’s are three-valued. Let us justify some expressions 
appearing in this table.1
• π(2 | 11) = max


π(Z1 = 2 | X1 = 1) ∗π(Z2 ≤ 2 | X2 = 1),
π(Z1 ≤ 2 | X1 = 1) ∗π(Z2 = 2 | X2 = 1),
κ2L ∗π(Z1 ≤ 2 | X1 = 1) ∗π(Z2 ≤ 2 | X2 = 1)
= max(κ211 ∗ 1,1 ∗ κ
21
2 ,κ
2
L ∗ 1 ∗ 1)=max(κ
21
1 ,κ
21
2 ,κ
2
L )
• π(1 | 22) = max


π(Z1 = 1 | X1 = 2) ∗π(Z2 ≤ 1 | X2 = 2),
π(Z1 ≤ 1 | X1 = 2) ∗π(Z2 = 1 | X2 = 2),
κ1L ∗π(Z1 ≤ 1 | X1 = 2) ∗π(Z2 ≤ 1 | X2 = 2)
= max(κ121 ∗ κ
12
2 ,κ
12
2 ∗ κ
12
1 ,κ
1
L ∗ κ
12
1 ∗ κ
12
2 )= κ
12
1 ∗ κ
12
2
• π(1 | 21) = max


π(Z1 = 1 | X1 = 2) ∗π(Z2 ≤ 1 | X2 = 1),
π(Z1 ≤ 1 | X1 = 2) ∗π(Z2 = 1 | X2 = 1),
κ1L ∗π(Z1 ≤ 1 | X1 = 2) ∗π(Z2 ≤ 1 | X2 = 1)
= max(κ121 ∗ 1,κ
12
1 ∗ 1,κ
1
L ∗ κ
12
1 ∗ 1)= κ
12
1
• π(y | 00) = max


π(Z1 = y | X1 = 0) ∗π(Z2 ≤ y | X2 = 0),
π(Z1 ≤ y | X1 = 0) ∗π(Z2 = y | X2 = 0),
κ
y
L ∗π(Z1 ≤ y | X1 = 0) ∗π(Z2 ≤ y | X2 = 0)
= max(0 ∗ 1,1 ∗ 0,κ
y
L ∗ 1 ∗ 1)= κ
y
L if y > 0 and 1 otherwise.
Note that in general, we can expect the fact that the external cause is less likely to produce a strong effect than a regular 
cause, so that in column π(2 | x), we may assume κ2L ≤min(κ
21
1 , κ
21
2 ) so that the leakage coefficient should only appear in 
the last line of Table 7.
When the Xi ’s are Boolean, we get Table 8, where only 4 lines remain:
More generally, if we have m levels of strength, and n causal variables, we need nm2 coefficients for defining the uncer-
tain MAX. If we take into account the leak, we have to add m(m+1)
2
coefficients per variable, in order to replace the 0 by a 
leak coefficient in the conditional tables π(Z i | Xi) (assuming that an effect of strong severity may take place even if the 
causes present have a weak intensity).
1 The expressions of π(1 | 21) and π(1 | 22) were erroneous in [8,11] for the uncertain MAX, and are corrected here.
Table 7
Uncertain leaky MAX.
x π(2 | x) π(1 | x) π(0 | x)
(2,2) 1 κ121 ∗ κ
12
2 κ
02
1 ∗ κ
02
2
(2,1) 1 κ121 κ
02
1 ∗ κ
01
2
(2,0) 1 κ121 κ
02
1
(1,2) 1 κ122 κ
01
1 ∗ κ
02
2
(1,1) max(κ211 ,κ
21
2 ,κ
2
L ) 1 κ
01
1 ∗ κ
01
2
(1,0) max(κ211 ,κ
2
L ) 1 κ
01
1
(0,2) 1 κ122 κ
02
2
(0,1) max(κ212 ,κ
2
L ) 1 κ
01
2
(0,0) κ2L κ
1
L 1
Table 8
Uncertain MAX with Boolean inputs.
x π(2 | x) π(1 | x) π(0 | x)
(2,2) 1 κ121 ∗ κ
12
2 κ
02
1 ∗ κ
02
2
(2,0) 1 κ121 κ
02
1
(0,2) 1 κ122 κ
02
2
(0,0) κ2L κ
1
L 1
Table 9
Uncertain leaky MIN.
x π(2|x) π(1|x) π(0|x)
(2,2) 1 max(κ121 ,κ
12
2 ) max(κ
02
1 ,κ
02
2 )
(2,1) max(κ212 ,κ
2
L ) 1 max(κ
02
1 ,κ
01
2 )
(2,0) κ2L κ
12
1 ∗ κ
1
L 1
(1,2) max(κ211 ,κ
2
L ) 1 max(κ
01
1 ,κ
02
2 )
(1,1) max(κ211 ∗ κ
21
2 ,κ
2
L ) 1 max(κ
01
1 ,κ
01
2 )
(1,0) κ2L κ
1
L 1
(0,2) κ2L κ
12
2 ∗ κ
1
L 1
(0,1) κ2L κ
1
L 1
(0,0) κ2L κ
1
L 1
Table 10
Uncertain MIN with Boolean inputs.
x π(2|x) π(1|x) π(0|x)
(2,2) 1 max(κ121 ,κ
12
2 ) max(κ
02
1 ,κ
02
2 )
(2,0) 0 κ121 1
(0,2) 0 κ122 1
(0,0) 0 0 1
3.5. Uncertain MIN
As for the uncertain MAX wrt uncertain OR, the uncertain MIN is a multiple-valued extension of the uncertain AND, 
where variables are valued on the intensity scale L = {0 < 1 < · · · < m}. We assume that Y = max(min(Z1, . . . , Zn), Z L), 
taking into account a leak variable. We can then compute the conditional tables, under the same assumptions as before, as
π(y | x1)= max
(z1,...,zn,zL)∈Ln+1:y=max(min(z1,...,zn),zL)
(∗ni=1π(zi | xi)) ∗π(zL)
=max
{
maxni=1π(Z i = y | xi) ∗5(Z L ≤ y) ∗
(
∗ j 6=i5(Z j ≥ y | x j)
)
,
π(Z L = y) ∗
(
maxni=15(Z i ≤ y | xi)
)
The conditional possibility tables are thus obtained by applying Eq. (5), using the same values of π(Z i | Xi), and κ
y
L as 
in the case of the uncertain leaky MAX. For n = 2, m = 2, this gives the following conditional Table 9 for ternary inputs.
Note that the leakage coefficients are more present in the leaky MIN than in the leaky MAX, even if the leakage coef-
ficients are small. This is not surprizing as it is enough to miss one of the two causes to fail the regular effect, and the 
external cause may then emerge as the reason for some unexpected effect in these more numerous situations. For binary 
inputs, it reduces to the conditional Table 10.
Table 11
Elementary causal probability table.
P (Z i |Xi) xi ¬xi
zi 1− κi 0
¬zi κi 1
Table 12
Noisy OR.
P (y | X1X2) x1 ¬x1
x2 1− κ1κ2 1− κ2
¬x2 1− κ1 0
P (¬y | X1X2) x1 ¬x1
x2 κ1κ2 κ2
¬x2 κ1 1
4. Comparison with probabilistic gates
It is interesting to compare the possibilistic and probabilistic tables as they do not behave in the same way. The elemen-
tary probabilistic causal table takes the following form, where κi = P (¬zi | xi) (see Table 11).
Consider the conditional table of the noisy OR [10] (Table 12), to be compared with the conditional table of the uncertain 
OR (Table 2).
We shall distinguish between min-based and product based possibilistic networks.
4.1. The min-based case
There is an important difference between the behavior of conditioning in the probabilistic and the possibilistic cases. 
In the qualitative possibility setting, the conditional possibility 5(Y | X) is the largest value λ such that min(λ, 5(X)) =
5(Y ∧ X), that is
5(Y | X)=
{
1 if5(Y ∧ X)=5(X);
5(Y ∧ X) if5(Y ∧ X) <5(X),
and the conditional necessity is N(Y | X) = 1 −5(¬Y | X). As a consequence it is impossible to have that 5(Y ) < 5(Y |
X) < 1, which dually expresses the impossibility that the certainty of an event can decrease while remaining somewhat
certain (one cannot have the strict inequality N(Y ) > N(Y | X) > 0) [13]. The min-based conditional possibility framework
thus does not capture the idea of graceful degradation of belief.
This is a striking difference with conditional probability where this limitation of expressive power does not occur. While 
this property is sometimes viewed as a major impediment to considering qualitative possibility as a reasonable represen-
tation of belief ([29] p. 265), this pessimistic view can be challenged. Note that one may simultaneously have N(y) > 0
and N(y | x) = 0 (and even N(¬y | x) > 0), so that the qualitative framework allows for severe belief change. Moreover, 
this limitation just indicates that the qualitative setting is rougher than the quantitative one, and that qualitative necessity 
degrees are not proportional to intensity of belief. In some situations this rough model is sufficient for the purpose at hand, 
as being more expressive than classical logic (since it allows for non-monotonic reasoning [4]).
A similar lack of expressiveness occurs when comparing the conditional possibility and probability tables in case of the 
OR connective (Tables 2 and 12). In the possibilistic table, we see (using the associated necessity measure N) that
N(y | x1x2)=max(N(y | x1¬x2),N(y | ¬x1x2))= 1−min(κ1,κ2)
while
P (y | x1x2)= 1− κ1 · κ2 >max(P (y | x1¬x2), P (y | ¬x1x2))=max(1− κ1,1− κ2),
so that in qualitative possibility networks, the uncertain OR gate does not allow the reinforcement the certainty of the effect 
in the presence of two causes, because connectives are idempotent.
4.2. The product-based case
If possibility degrees are numerical and ∗ = product, the conditional possibility is just defined by the usual division 
(5(Y | X) = 5(X∧Y )
5(X)
), so that we can model the graceful degradation of beliefs (5(Y ) < 5(Y | X) < 1 may occur). The 
possibilistic network then behaves like a probabilistic network because N(y | x1x2) = 1 − κ1 · κ2 >max(N(y | x1¬x2), N(y |
¬x1x2)) is also retrieved.
However, another major difference in behavior between uncertain and noisy OR-gates will occur in case the effects of 
causes are not frequent (weak causes), namely when P (¬zi | xi) = κi > 0.5, i = 1, 2. Then it may happen that P (y | x1x2) =
1 − κ1κ2 > 0.5, that is the simultaneous presence of two causes that individually do not frequently produce an effect may 
Table 13
Uncertain OR for 2 weak causes.
π(y | X1X2) x1 ¬x1
x2 max(λ1, λ2) λ2
¬x2 λ1 0
π(¬y | X1X2) x1 ¬x1
x2 1 1
¬x2 1 1
Table 14
Uncertain OR for strong and weak causes.
π(y | X1X2) x1 ¬x1
x2 1 1
¬x2 λ1 0
π(¬y | X1X2) x1 ¬x1
x2 κ2 κ2
¬x2 1 1
make this effect more frequent than not. Then a possibilistic rendering of this case must be such that π(¬zi | xi) = 1 >
π(zi | xi) = λi . Then the uncertain OR-gate with two weak causes behaves as indicated in Table 13.
However, there is no way of observing a reversal effect, since π(y | x1x2) =max(λ1 ∗λ2, λ1, λ2) =max(λ1, λ2) < 1. Hence 
π(¬y | x1x2) = 1 and N(y | x1x2) = 0. In other words, using the uncertain OR, two causes that are individually insufficient 
to make an effect plausible are still insufficient to make it plausible if joined together, because on the one hand there is 
no reinforcement effect in this case, and there is no way of producing 1 from operands that are less than 1. Note that this 
fact reminds of the property of closure under conjunction for necessity measures in possibility theory (N(y1) > N(¬y1)
and N(y2) > N(¬y2) imply N(y1 ∧ y2) > N(¬(y1 ∧ y2))) which fail to hold in probability theory, where a reversal effect is 
possible in this case.
The case with one weak cause and one strong one is also worth studying, say cause 1 is weak (π(¬z1 | x1) = 1 > π(z1 |
x1) = λ2) and the other is strong (π(z2 | x2) = 1 > π(¬z2 | xi) = κ2).
Then, one observes that the strong cause alone makes the effect somewhat certain to the same degree as in the ele-
mentary causal table, independently of the presence or not of the weak one. When the strong cause is absent, the effect is 
absent with a weak certainty as per the presence or not of the weak cause. Note that in the possibilistic case, we need the 
three Tables 2, 13, 14 that represent a distinct behavior each case, while the probability Table 12 is valid in the three cases, 
while the believed effects depend on the numerical values given in the table.
4.3. Should possibilistic logical gates be mended?
Note that insofar as the behavior of the uncertain possibilistic gates is judged counterintuitive in a given context, it 
would be possible to change the combination of the elementary conditional tables. For instance one may define the global 
conditional possibility tables π(Y | X1, X2) enforcing π(y | x1x2) > π(¬y | x1x2) even if π(y | x1) < π(¬y | x1) and π(y |
x2) < π(¬y | x2), which is perfectly compatible with possibility theory. However, one may also claim that the possibilistic 
OR gate behaves as expected and that the systematic cumulative behavior of the noisy OR is questionable, depending on 
what we intend to model.
Consider the case when P (zi | xi) = P (¬zi | xi) = κi = 0.5 for i = 1, 2. Note that then P (y | x1x2) = 0.75.
• Interpreting κi as a frequency: Then this result can be easily explained. As when cause xi is present irrespective of the
other cause, the effect y is present 50% of the results, and causes are independent of each other, this effect is produced
25% of the time when x1 is present and x2 is absent, 25% of the time when x2 is present and x1 is absent, and 25%
of the time when x1 and x2 are present. So no surprize that the reinforcement effect in favor of y can be observed.
However, the possibilistic model, due to its maxitive nature, cannot account for equiprobability, hence cannot model
this situation.
• Interpreting κi as a degree of belief: then κi = 0.5 represent the agent’s ignorance whether xi causes y or not. Under
this view, the probabilistic approach produces a counterintuitive result. Indeed, it is very hard to make sense of the
reasoning line whereby given that the agent ignores whether xi causes y or not, for i = 1, 2, this agent should believe
that the presence of both causes makes the effect y more likely than its negation. It is one more example of production
of knowledge out of sheer ignorance, which is usual when uniform probability is interpreted as lack of information.
Actually, the uncertain OR gate behaves consistently with the situation of ignorance: if it is believed that each xi causes 
¬y, rather than y, then there is no way of starting to believe y when observing two reasons not to believe it. And in the 
case of ignorance, the uncertain OR-gate just produces ignorance.
These results extend to other gates like the uncertain MAX, for instance. Again, the simultaneous presence of a number 
of causes, which, taken in isolation, do not normally produce an effect, may lead to a plausible effect under a noisy MAX, 
which can never be the case with an uncertain MAX.
However, in the following, we are interested in representing the same dataset by probabilistic and possibilistic networks 
for the sake of comparing both models on an application. Then we try to modify the construction of the conditional possi-
bilistic table from elementary ones in order to get closer to the probabilistic model. Note that we can imagine various ways 
of completing the possibilistic conditional tables from the knowledge of local conditional tables 5(Z i | Xi) For instance we 
may use an aggregation operation ⊗ [2] on the possibility scale and define 5(Y | X1X2) as 5(Z1 | X1) ⊗5(Z2 | X2) with the 
constraint Y = Z1 = Z2 . However, since aggregation operations are order-preserving and such that 1 ⊗ 1 = 1 and 0 ⊗ 0 = 0, 
we cannot address the case when weak causes join to make a strong one in the possibilistic setting using this approach.
4.4. Uncertain MAX with thresholds
As observed in Section 4 when comparing the uncertain OR to the noisy OR, the simultaneous presence of a number 
of causes, which, taken in isolation, do not normally produce an effect, may lead to a plausible effect under a noisy MAX, 
which can never be the case with an uncertain MAX. Yet, situations of this kind do arise in applications and are fully 
compatible with the expression of a conditional table in possibility theory.
In order to make the construction of possibility tables in agreement with the mutual reinforcement of weak causes an 
appropriate uncertain gate has to be designed, by means of a suitable uncertain function f which can produce this effect. 
One idea we have tested in order to approximate such behavior is the proposal of uncertain MAX with thresholds. In addition 
to the usual parameters of an uncertain MAX, this uncertain gate requires that a threshold θ j be specified for each value y j
of the effect variable Y . Such threshold is an integer expressing the minimum number of causes that have to simultaneously 
occur in order for effect y j to become possible. To this end, a cause Xi may be considered to “occur” if the value of its 
corresponding intermediary causal variable Z i differs from the zero level, i.e., Z i > 0. Note that threshold gates also exist in 
the probabilistic setting [10].
More precisely, as in the case of the uncertain MAX, we assume that the output variable Y and the variables Z i are 
valued on a finite, totally ordered, severity or intensity scale L = {0 < 1 < · · ·<m}, but the function f describing this gate 
is based upon may be written as
Y =max(Z1, . . . , Zn,
m
max
i=1
{i · 1[‖{ j:Z j>0}‖≥θi ]}),
using the inverson bracket notation, whereby
1[condition] =
{
1, if condition is true;
0, otherwise.
For instance, suppose n = 4, m = 3, θ1 = 1, θ2 = 2, θ3 = 3, θ4 = 4. Then f (1, 1, 0, 0) = 2, f (1, 1, 1, 0) = 3, f (1, 1, 1, 1) = 4.
We can then express the conditional table of the uncertain MAX with thresholds by applying the extension principle, as 
in the case of the uncertain MAX, although the resulting analytical expression is much less legible:
π f (y | x1, . . . , xn)= max
Z1,...,Zn:y=max(Z1,...,Zn,max
m
i=1{i·1[‖{ j:Z j>0}‖≥θi ]})
∗ni=1π(Z i | xi)
=max
(
1[‖{i|xi>0}‖≥θy ],
n
max
j=1
π(Z j = y | x j) ∗
(
∗ j 6=i5(Z j ≤ y | x j)
))
.
More intuitively, by default π(y | x1, . . . , xn) has the same value as with the uncertain MAX, except when the number of 
occurring causes exceeds the threshold for value y, in which case π(y | x1, . . . , xn) = 1.
The global conditional tables are then obtained by applying Eq. (5), using the same values of π(Z i | Xi) as in the case 
of the uncertain MAX. For n = 2, m = 2 (i.e., Y and the Xi ’s three-valued), θ2 = 2, and θ1 =m + 1 (i.e., no threshold set for 
Y = 1), the following conditional Table 15 is obtained. The only cell where possibility is raised to 1 due to the thresholds 
is marked by a dagger (†): the fact that two causes weakly present ((1, 1)) as input cause the strongest effect with full 
possibility.
It is easy to check that π f is less specific than πMAX , which means that the imitation of the noisy MAX is imperfect. For 
instance, one may wish to decrease the value π(1 | (1, 1)) in Table 15, since the value π(2 | (1, 1)) has been set to 1; this 
would occur in a probabilistic approach as the sum of probabilities in each line is 1. However, this is not possible using the 
definition of f . But we are allowed to decrease the value π(1 | (1, 1)) manually, as long as the maximum of values in each 
line of Table 15 is 1.
5. Implementation
A prototype involving the uncertain connectives defined above, allowing to execute possibilistic models such as the one 
described in Section 6 has been implemented in R. Here, we give some details about the practical implementation of the 
uncertain connectives defined in the paper. We focus in particular on the uncertain MAX (and its variant with thresholds), 
whose implementation is non-trivial.
The way the uncertain MAX is implemented is shown in Algorithm 1. The parameter prm taken as input by this algorithm 
may be thought of as representing a set of rules of the form
(Xi = xi)⇒ Y ∼ (κi,y0 , . . . ,κi,ym), (7)
Table 15
Uncertain MAX with thresholds.
x π(2 | x) π(1 | x) π(0 | x)
(2,2) 1 max(κ121 ,κ
12
2 ) κ
02
1 ∗ κ
02
2
(2,1) 1 1 κ021 ∗ κ
01
2
(2,0) 1 κ121 κ
02
1
(1,2) 1 1 κ011 ∗ κ
02
2
(1,1) 1† 1 κ011 ∗ κ
01
2
(1,0) κ211 1 κ
01
1
(0,2) 1 κ122 κ
02
2
(0,1) κ212 1 κ
01
2
(0,0) 0 0 1
Algorithm 1 uncertain-MAX(Y , prm). Generate a conditional possibility table for variable Y given its causes X1, . . . , Xn
using the uncertain MAX with its given parameters prm.
Input: Y : the effect variable;
prm= {〈condi , ki〉}: a set of normalized possibility distributions ki = (κi1, . . . , κi‖Y‖), max j=1,...,‖Y‖{κi j} = 1, which apply when condition condi holds;
condi = (〈Xi , xi〉), a (possibly empty) pair of a cause variable Xi and one of its values xi ; condi holds if Xi = xi holds; an empty condition always holds.
Output: π(Y | X1, . . . , Xn): a conditional possibility distribution of Y given its causes X1, . . . , Xn .
1: π(Y | X1, . . . , Xn) ← 0
2: for all x ∈ X1 × . . .× Xn do
3: K ←{k : 〈cond, k〉 ∈ prm, x |= cond} {Select the elementary possibility distributions that apply to x}
4: for all y = (y1, . . . , y‖K‖) ∈ Y
‖K‖ do
5: β←mini=1,...,‖K‖{κiyi }
6: y¯←maxi=1,...,‖K‖{yi}
7: π( y¯ | x)←max{β,π( y¯ | x)}
8: end for
9: end for
10: return π(Y | X1, . . . , Xn)
where Xi on the left-hand side is a parent variable of Y in the possibilistic graphical model, xi are one of their values, 
and (κi,y0 , . . . , κi,ym ) is a normalized possibility distribution over the values of variable Y , i.e., for all y ∈ Y , κi,y ∈ [0, 1], 
and maxy∈Y κi,y = 1. Note that the Xi ’s in the above rules can in fact represent vectors of more elementary interacting 
variables, and allow to encode multi-condition tables not representable by combining simple conditional tables involving 
such variables in isolation.
The left-hand side of a rule may be empty:in that case, the rule is interpreted as if it were statements of the form
Y ∼ (κL,y0 , . . . ,κL,ym ). (8)
Such rules may be used to represent leakage coefficients, which apply to all possible combinations of causes.
On the one hand, this choice of representation of the parameters generalizes the uncertain gates to the case of multival-
ued variables; on the other hand, it allows the expert to express its knowledge of the phenomenon in more intuitive terms, 
in the form of rules, which is entirely in the spirit of making expert knowledge elicitation easier.
Albeit such representation is more intuitive, it requires some additional care: the antecedents of the rules fed into the 
uncertain MAX must cover all possible combinations x ∈ X1× . . .× Xn of the values of the parent variables of Y in order to 
ensure that the resulting conditional possibility distribution π(Y | X1, . . . , Xn) be normalized. However, we may notice that, 
if a leak rule of the form of Eq. (8) is given, that rule alone already covers all combinations of parent variable values and 
is thus a sufficient condition for the normalization of π(Y | X1, . . . , Xn); in that case, the parameters of the uncertain MAX 
may be underspecified.
The algorithm constructs the table of conditional possibility in an incremental way, starting with a table filled with zeros 
(Line 1), and then considering all combinations of values for the cause variables (Line 2). For a given combination x, which 
corresponds to a row of the table, a subset K of normalized possibility distributions that apply to x is extracted from the 
parameters (Line 3). Lines 4–8 compute one min expression of Eq. (5), by considering all the combinations of parameters 
in the possibility distributions of K and update the corresponding cell (the one in the column of the maximum y of the 
combination) if the result of the min exceeds its current value, so that, once this inner loop completed, the max in Eq. (5)
will have been computed for all the cells of the row corresponding to x.
The implementation of the uncertain MAX with thresholds follows the same pattern as the previous algorithm.
6. Application
Probabilistic and possibilistic networks using noisy/uncertain logical gates have been used to model the social specializa-
tion of municipalities in a metropolitan area, under a human geography perspective (alternative models have been proposed 
in the economic literature like rent-gap theory models for urban gentrification and hedonic price models for environmental 
Fig. 1. The BN model for the valorization/devalorization of municipalities in the study area (adapted from [28]).
amenities for rural and suburban developments). We will first present the models and their logical gates. We will then com-
pare the uncertainty content of the trend scenarios produced by the two models and we will finally evaluate the sensitivity 
of model outcomes to probabilistic and possibilistic elicited parameters.
6.1. Model specification
The metropolitan area of Aix-Marseille in southern France has experienced ongoing social polarization since the 1980s. 
The geography of unemployment, on the one hand, and the concentration of high-skilled professionals, on the other, both 
considerably contribute to the structuring of a contrasted metropolitan social morphology [9,17]. The knowledge of factors 
inducing social polarization of the municipalities in the metropolitan area is nevertheless uncertain. Social polarization 
is analyzed as the opposition of valorized municipalities, hosting wealthier resident populations and namely high-skilled 
professionals, and devalorized municipalities, hosting lower-income populations and, more particularly, the unemployed. 
Several factors contribute to the valorization or to the devalorization of the municipal residential space. But these factors 
have “soft”, uncertain impacts on the phenomena under investigation: the same causes can sometimes produce different 
effects and observed effects can have multiple possible causes.
A probabilistic model of these socio-spatial mechanisms has already been proposed [28] (cf. Fig. 1) in the form of a 
Bayesian network (BN). The BN was built using expert knowledge elicited through noisy logical gates (OR, AND, and MAX) 
with leak parameters (taking into account the impact of factors omitted in the model). We then developed a min-based 
possibilistic network (PN) using uncertain logical gates (OR, AND and MAX-threshold) with leak parameters in order to 
link the same 26 variables of the BN. The possibilistic network has exactly the same structure as the BN model shown 
in Fig. 1. The numerical parameters of the PN were made compatible with the BN parameters using a least committing 
probability-to-possibility preference preserving transformation [14] in order to transform probability degrees into numerical 
possibility degrees.
This transformation was used by lack of expert data in the form of possibility distributions. We started with a Bayesian 
network with already existing probabilistic data. It was not possible to start the data collection again and train experts into 
forwarding possibility degrees instead of probability degrees. And our intention was to compare the results of possibilistic 
and probabilistic networks on the same data, which means keeping the ordinal information contained in the probabilistic 
data. Using a least committed probability-to-possibility preference preserving transformation at the local level was a natural 
way of generating such possibilistic counterparts of subjective probabilistic data, even if we are aware that making local 
probability-to-possibility transforms is for instance not equivalent to making probability-to-possibility transforms of the 
joint probability, as studied in [7]. Note that the same issues occur when trying to learn possibilistic networks from data 
[18].
In Fig. 2 we show how an Uncertain OR logical gate can be used to generate a conditional probability table. Only three 
parameters must be elicited: the possible influence of the two parent variables on the child variable (necessity of the 
consequence given that the parents are sufficient causes) and the leak parameter, which takes into account the activation of 
the consequence from secondary causes not included in the model. This table allows possibilistic prediction from uncertain 
Fig. 2. Generation of a conditional probability table through an Uncertain OR logical gate.
knowledge. If, for example, in a given municipality of the study area, we are relatively certain of the presence of natural 
areas (5 = 1, N = 0.5) and if it is only partially possible that agricultural areas are considered attractive and valorizing 
for residential use (5 = 0.5, this is for example the case for vineyards but not for industrial crops), we can infer that it is 
relatively certain (N = 0.5) that the municipality in question has environmental amenities.
Another difference between the min-based possibilistic model and the probabilistic one is the capability, for the former, 
of keeping track of the κi parameters in the reasoning process, in order to figure out the sensitivity of results to the 
parameters of uncertain causation. The issue of sensitivity analysis for general min-based possibilistic networks is especially 
discussed by Parsons [22] (Chapters 7 and 8).
The advantage of uncertain logical gates can be better appreciated in the whole model (Fig. 1). Evolution is, for example, 
a ternary variable (having three values: no evolution, valorization, and devalorization) depending on 5 binary variables and 
one 4-value variable. The conditional probability table is thus made of 3 × 25 × 4 = 384 parameters, whereas the uncertain 
MAX-threshold gate used in our PN model requires at most 27 parameters (indeed only 10 κi and θ j parameters different 
from 0 and 1 are used in our model).
Evolution is typically a multi-valued variable with a hierarchical order of values. Urban geographers [28] consider that 
valorization is the value with highest priority: when social groups of higher purchasing power decide to live in a given 
municipality, real estate prices go up and other social groups are crowded out. It corresponds to the highest severity effect 
in section 3.4. The second priority effect is devalorization: when a given set of causes operates in order to specialize the 
municipality in retaining inhabitants of lower social status, this effect has greater priority (severity) than no effect at all. 
Finally, the absence of change in the social mix of the municipality is the default outcome (no effect), in the absence of 
particular triggers for valorization and/or devalorization.
The diffusion of valorization (i.e., the spatial diffusion of suburban and rural gentrification within the metropolitan area 
through residential flows of high-skilled professionals) and the presence of assets for rural and suburban gentrification are 
triggers of valorization for a given municipality.
The attraction of residential flows of unemployed people (diffusion_devalorization variable in the model) and the presence 
of obstacles to rural and suburban gentrification are triggers of devalorization. The long-term instability of the social mix 
in the municipality over the last 20 years and its particular geographic location with respect to the social mix of neighbor-
ing municipalities can be triggers of either valorization or devalorization. Valorization and devalorization are nevertheless 
uncommon outcomes in the presence of only one of these triggering factors, as these are normally relatively weak: in the 
probabilistic model, several triggers have to be simultaneously present in order to cumulate probability values and make 
the absence of change less probable. Several specifications of the uncertain MAX connective were considered in order to 
replicate as much as possible the probabilistic behavior of the BN model. A MAX-threshold connective saturating possibility 
values of uncommon outcomes when three concurrent causes are present was finally selected.
Again, as discussed in Section 4 we have two ways of understanding the above situation. Viewed in terms of frequencies, 
the reinforcement effect of the probabilities of residential moves due to several triggers, using a noisy MAX, is in line 
with the actual phenomenon of people changing their dwelling places, while viewed in terms of subjective probabilities, 
this reinforcement effect is more difficult to justify, as in this case, equal probabilities of opposite events just represent 
ignorance, and not equal proportions of moves in one direction and in another. Then the probabilistic approach surprizingly 
transforms ignorance into the prediction of a trend, while the possibilistic approach using the uncertain MAX with threshold 
just increases the range of possibilities, and therefore more cautiously increases the imprecision of conclusions, in case of 
several weak triggering factors.
The use of the uncertain MAX with threshold gives the best results on the empirical values of the 439 municipalities 
of the study area in terms of proximity to the probabilistic predictions (which were in turn transformed in possibilistic 
values to allow comparison). Alternative variants of the uncertain max with upper and lower thresholds and even with 
two different thresholds (a first threshold for making the uncommon effects completely possible and a second threshold 
for making the absence of change not plausible) were also considered. The two-threshold specifications are in theory better 
able to replicate the behavior of the probabilistic model, but prove not better than the simpler one-threshold model for 
the empirical results, although requiring additional elicited parameters. The bias introduced by the simpler one-threshold 
connective is its inability to foresee the necessity of change, a phenomenon that, although rare, is sometimes found among 
the 439 municipalities of the study area.
Whatever the specification of the MAX connective, the Evolution variable determines, together with the Situation T1
variable, the value of the Situation T2 variable in a ten years simulation period. Situation T1 (the reference year is here 2009) 
and Situation T2 (2019) have three possible values: Valorized (V ), Devalorized (D) or Other (O ). Values of Situation T1 are 
considered to be known without uncertainty (Fig. 3a). Values of Situation T2 are not observable and have to be inferred by 
the model.
6.2. Comparative results
Both the BN and the PN model were thus used to produce trend scenarios for social polarization in the 439 municipalities 
of the Aix-Marseille metropolitan area through the prediction of Situation T2 values.
Both scenarios are based on uncertain knowledge of relationships among variables and produce an uncertain evaluation 
of the future state of the metropolitan area in terms of social polarization. Most plausible values (in terms of probabil-
ity/possibility) inferred by the two models can be projected in space (Fig. 3). With the probabilistic model, we display a 
most probable value of Situation T2 for each municipality (Fig. 3b). This often gives a fallacious impression of certainty: dif-
ferences between most probable values can be relatively small and are not taken into account on the figure. The possibilistic 
model, using a min–max logic, produces in many cases sets of completely possible values (5 = 1, Fig. 3c). In Fig. 3, these 
are represented as circles with multiple colors (two different outcomes equally possible) or as grey circles (three different 
outcomes equally possible, which is the most uncertain model result). We thus decided to test the significance of the prob-
ability differences in the BN model: only probability differences exceeding a given threshold were considered significant. For 
a given probability threshold, we could thus exhibit small sets of “equally” most probable values for some municipalities, 
even with the BN. Fig. 3d, e and f, show results for threshold probability differences of 0.1, 0.2 and 0.3, respectively.
If no threshold is considered, the most probable values inferred by the BN and the completely possible values inferred 
by the PN coincide only in 54.7% of cases. In the remaining cases, possibilistic results are more uncertain and always include 
probabilistic results (most probable values are always completely possible for the PN).
The best agreement between the two models is obtained with thresholds 0.20 and 0.25 (lower and higher values give 
worse results). Respectively 72.4% and 77.2% of the inferred values are then identical. Most probable values are almost 
always compatible with PN solutions: they are included in the completely possible values as, for example, when {V , O }
are the most probable values and {V , O , D} is the set of completely possible values. The inverse is not always the case: 
depending on the threshold value, 24% and 18% of possibilistic solutions are not included in the most probable values.
Keeping in mind that possibilistic results tend to be slightly less restrictive (and hence more uncertain) than the prob-
abilistic counterparts, both models show that the outcome for several municipalities is not completely uncertain, but is 
made of two equally probable/possible states. Complete uncertainty is still the case for 130 spatial units for the PN and 
85 for the BN; these are often neither too peripheral nor too central within the metropolitan area. In this respect, these 
uncertainty-based models could be used to better highlight areas of insufficient knowledge.
6.3. An empirical sensitivity analysis to elicited parameters
A sensitivity analysis of the two models has been performed with respect to the elicited parameters of the MAX connec-
tive governing the Evolution variable. This is a particularly crucial variable for the models, directly influencing the Situation T2
variable and depending, directly or indirectly, from almost all causal relations contained in the models. The sensitivity anal-
ysis was conducted using the empirical data: by varying the values of the elicited parameters, we did not assess how the 
conditional probability/possibility tables were modified. Instead, we assessed how the parameter changes would affect the 
predictions on the most plausible outcomes of the Situation T2 variable for the 439 municipalities of the study area. This 
empirical sensitivity analysis is much more interesting for the practical use of the model in decision making on the study 
area.
In the reference BN, the Noisy MAX connective for Evolution is parametrized as follows. Triggers of valorization or de-
valorization have probabilistic strength κi equal to 0.3 only. Triggers of devalorization and devalorization have probabilistic 
strength of 0.12 and 0.18, respectively (a slightly higher probabilistic strength is given to the production of the devalorization 
effect in order to counter the priority rule of the connective and produce an unbiased model with equal marginal probabil-
ities for the two effects). The absence of effect has thus always a conditional probability of 0.7. Under the hypothesis that 
these elicited values correspond to reality, we will use the most probable values of the Situation T2 variable for the 439 
municipalities as the benchmark of the analysis.
Fig. 3. Probabilistic and possibilistic results projected in space.
We first consider a model where experts overestimate the probabilistic strength of triggering factors, by reducing the 
conditional probability of absence of effect to 0.6 and by increasing to 0.4, 0.25, and 0.15 the κi parameters of the Noisy MAX 
connective. Most probable values of Situation T2 are in 84.1% of cases the same as in the reference model (Table 16, left). In 
the remaining 15.9% of cases, they are different and incompatible (for these municipalities, a valorized or a devalorized state 
is now inferred, whereas the reference model would infer the value other as most probable). We subsequently consider a 
model underestimating the probabilistic strength of factors, by increasing the conditional probability of absence of effect to 
0.8 and by decreasing to 0.2, 0.12, and 0.08 the κi parameters. The most probable values of Situation T2 are now in 90.2% of 
cases the same as in the reference model (Table 16, right). In the remaining cases, the new model predicts the state other, 
whereas the reference model would infer a valorized or a devalorized state as the most probable.
In the reference PN, the Uncertain MAX-threshold connective is parametrized in accordance to a least committing trans-
formation of the corresponding probabilistic parameters. κi for triggers of valorization or devalorization only is 0.6, κi for 
triggers of both effects is 0.5 (devalorization) and 0.4 (valorization). The behavior of this connective makes the absence of 
effect always completely possible, whereas a given effect is completely possible only in the presence of three triggers. Over-
and underestimation of possibilistic strength of triggers concern both the κi parameters and the θ j thresholds. Over- and 
Table 16
Empirical sensitivity analysis for the BN model.
Reference model
Model with overestimated parameters Model with underestimated parameters
O D V Total O D V Total
O 117 30 38 185 185 185
D 100 2 102 17 85 102
V 152 152 26 126 152
Total 117 130 192 439 228 85 126 439
Overall agreement 84.1% 90.2%
Incompatibilities 15.9% 9.8%
Table 17
Empirical sensitivity analysis for the PN model.
Ref. model
Model with overestimated parameters Model with underestimated parameters
O D V V O V O D Total O D V V O V OD Total
O 82 3 85 85 85
D 41 29 70 70 70
D , O 52 52 52 52
V 85 85 85 85
V , O 17 17 17 17
V , O , D 130 130 40 48 42 130
Total 82 41 85 20 211 439 137 70 125 65 42 439
Overall agreement 80.9% 68.1%
Incompatibilities 0.0% 0.0%
underestimated parameters of the PN are thus obtained through least specific transformations of the probabilistic parame-
ters. θ j thresholds are set to 2 and 4, respectively, reflecting the number of triggering factors whose presence is sufficient 
to make absence of effect non-plausible in the modified probabilistic models.
Table 17(left) shows how the most plausible predictions of the overestimated model coincide only in 80.9% of cases 
with those of the reference PN. Trend scenario predictions for several municipalities become completely uncertain while 
previously being D or {D, O }. The under-estimated model is even more deviant from the reference one (Table 17, right). 
Only 68.1% of predictions agree with those of the reference model: many O predictions replace {D, O } predictions and 
V or {V , O } predictions replace completely uncertain ones of the form {V , O , D}. Nevertheless, in the first case the new 
predictions include the predictions of the reference model by introducing more uncertainty, and in the second case the new 
predictions are included in the reference predictions by reducing their uncertainty.
At first glance, the BN model seems less sensitive to small disturbances in the probabilistic parameters of the Noisy MAX 
connective, compared to its possibilistic counterpart. However, the advantage of the PN model lies elsewhere. The 15.9% 
and 9.8% predictions of the disturbed BN that differ from those of the reference model are incompatible with the latter. 
By allowing more uncertainty, the 19.1% and 31.9% of predictions of the disturbed PN models that differ from those of the 
reference model are restrictions or generalizations of them and the predictions of the three models are mutually compatible 
(in the sense that they are nested sets of possible results).
6.4. Lessons drawn
In conclusion, uncertain logical gates made the construction of the PN model possible. The use of most probable solutions 
of the BN model often gives a false impression of certainty. In order to compare results from the BN and the PN models, 
we need to enlarge the notion of most probable values: solutions whose probabilities differ less than 0.20/0.25 must be 
considered as equally probable. In this case, the solutions of the two models are identical for about three fourths of the 
municipalities of the study area. Despite this consistency between the two approaches, the possibilistic model integrates a 
larger amount of uncertainty in the solutions inferred. Indeed, in the remaining fourth of municipalities, completely possible 
values inferred by the PN are normally larger sets than most probable values inferred by the BN. The BN model also tends 
to overestimate the valorization of municipalities in the study area: the PN model often predicts complete uncertainty 
({V , O , D} all equally possible) whereas the most plausible values are just V or {V , O } in the probabilistic model. A further 
analysis of the parametrization of the two models is nevertheless necessary in order to understand the origin of such a bias.
The results of the sensitivity analysis of the model predictions to the parameters governing their key variable (through 
a MAX connective) are apparently counterintuitive. The probabilistic model seems to be less affected by parameter distur-
bances than its possibilistic counterpart, but, at a closer look, BN predictions, when restricted to the most probable values, 
are more unstable than PN predictions: the former can be incompatible under slightly different parameter choices, whereas 
the latter, by allowing more uncertainty, are always nested sets of solutions generalizing or restricting the results obtained 
by different parameter choices.
7. Conclusion
This is the first detailed study of the counterpart of the main probabilistic noisy gates for possibilistic networks, together 
with an illustrative implementation on a human geography application. Uncertain possibilistic gates are of primary interest 
for the practical use of possibilistic networks, when uncertainty has an epistemic flavor. The study has revealed some 
noticeable differences of behavior between noisy gates and uncertain possibilistic gates, in particular when the cumulation 
of causes having a rare effect may increase the plausibility of the effect. Generally speaking, possibilistic modeling appears 
to be more cautious. A detailed comparative study of the expressive power of Bayesian nets and possibilistic networks is a 
topic for further investigation, as well as the development of a complete panoply of uncertain possibilistic gates.
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